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Studies have reported substantial mnestic deﬁcits in patients with schizophrenia. Most of this research,
however, has focussed on errors of omission (poor recall/recognition) rather than commission (such as false
recall/recognition). Nevertheless, recent studies report that schizophrenics show increased false recognition
and speculate that this may underpin delusional ideation (Moritz et al., 2004). No previous study has exam-
ined whether such memory problems exist in normal individuals who may be prone to delusional thinking.
Using the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm, we investigated memory functioning in 105 normal
healthy subjects divided according to performance on a measure of delusional ideation (Peters et al. Delu-
sional Inventory: PDI Peters et al., 1999). We found signiﬁcantly poorer recall in the high than low PDI
group. Moreover, high PDI scorers also made more false-alarm memory recalls than low PDI scorers.
In a recognition test, high and low PDI subjects did not diﬀer in the conﬁdence they attached to recognition
of studied items, but high PDI subjects gave greater conﬁdence for falsely accepting unseen items. This sug-
gests that healthy subjects scoring high on a measure of delusional thinking do show an increased tendency
to make false positives, but not to make false negative memory judgements.
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Little doubt remains that patients with schizophrenia have substantial memory deﬁcits and that
multiple aspects of memory are aﬀected (see Aleman, Hijman, De Haan, & Kahn, 1999 for a
meta-analysis); with deﬁcits reported in short-term memory, working memory, semantic memory,
episodic memory, recognition memory and recall. Most of this research has concentrated, how-
ever, on forgetting (i.e. false negative memories) and little attention has been directed to problems
of false remembering (i.e. false positive memories); or the conﬁdence with which individuals hold
false memories.
As well as underlying confabulation in neurological patients, memory disorders have been
linked to certain psychotic symptoms including delusional thinking (Johnson & Raye, 1998). Nev-
ertheless, memory deﬁcits per se are clearly insuﬃcient to cause delusional thoughts because
otherwise most amnesics would suﬀer with delusions. Additional factor(s) must therefore be
important. One view of delusions is that the proneness to form false beliefs (delusions) may in part
reﬂect overconﬁdence in incorrect or implausible judgments or a jump to conclusions way of
thinking (Garety & Hemsley, 1994). Evidence for this comes from research documenting that sim-
ple memory intrusions are common in patients with schizophrenia. Studies of source monitoring
(Moritz & Woodward, 2002; Moritz, Woodward, & Ruﬀ, 2003) reveal an enhanced conﬁdence for
false memories in schizophrenics compared to healthy controls. Indeed, Moritz and Woodward
(2002) showed that 12% of high conﬁdence responses made by schizophrenics were errors (com-
pared to a ﬁgure of 5% in controls). Moritz et al. (2003) examined the semantic associations pro-
vided by schizophrenics to word lists and then asked them to identify each item as old/new and
state the degree of conﬁdence in the word and the attribution. Their results suggested that the core
cognitive deﬁcit underlying schizophrenia was the failure to distinguish false from true basic con-
tents; with enhanced conﬁdence for false memories and no diﬀerences for correct decisions.
Two recent studies have used the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm to examine false
positive memory in schizophrenic patients (Elveva˚g, Fisher, Weickert, Weinberger, & Goldberg,
2004; Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, Whitman, & Watson, 2004). In the Roediger and McDermott
paradigm, participants are presented with a series of words (e.g. hill, climb, valley, summit, top,
molehill, peak, plain, glacier, goat, bike, climber, range, steep) that are strong associates of a non-
studied target item (e.g. mountain). Roediger and McDermott (1995) and others (e.g. Deese,
1959) have found that healthy controls often falsely recall or recognise the unseen target word
in subsequent testing and furthermore, such false memories are often given with high conﬁdence.
Although they found poorer memory in patients, neither Elveva˚g et al. (2004) nor Moritz et al.
(2004) found greater incidence of false memories in patients than controls. Nonetheless, these
studies are confronted with the problem of poor overall memory in patients with schizophrenia
and this may have protected the patients from making false positives. Finally, it is important
to note that neither study explicitly examined deluded patients and this could well be a critical
factor.
In the current study, we used the Roediger and McDermott (1995) paradigm (see also Deese,
1959) to investigate recall, recognition and memory conﬁdence in healthy individuals with high
and low delusional ideation as measured by the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI: Peters,
Joseph, & Garety, 1999)—a measure of delusional ideation developed for use in the normal pop-
ulation. It has been documented, using formal diagnostic interview, that bizarre delusions were
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1991). Studies of normal subjects in this manner overcome the problem of poor memory per se
and can explicitly examine for any relationship between delusional thinking and a tendency to
produce false positive memories. We predict that proneness to delusional thinking will be associ-
ated not just with poorer recall memory, but also with an increased tendency to make false pos-
itives (especially for Target words i.e. closely related to the list but not in the list itself). Finally, as
with the high conviction attached to many delusions in patient samples, we predict that high PDI
scorers will attach high conﬁdence to their false positive memories.2. Method
2.1. Participants
One hundred and ﬁve undergraduates (55 males and 50 females) aged between 18–31 years old
(M = 21, SD = 2.3 years) were tested. None volunteered a previous history of mental illness, alco-
hol or drug abuse. Participants received research credits required for fulﬁlment of their degree
programme for taking part in the study. The participants were divided into two non-overlapping
groups of high and low PDI scorers by dividing them at the PDI median—this resulted in 54 with
Low PDI scores (M = 0.69; SD = 0.84; range 0–2) and 51 with High PDI scores (M = 6.43;
SD = 3.13; range 3–18). The mean of the high PDI scorers was slightly lower, but comparable
to that reported by Peters et al. (1999) for their healthy sample of 272 (M = 9.7; SD = 6.7) and
substantially lower than that reported for their deluded patient sample of 20 (M = 20.7; SD = 9).
2.2. Materials/apparatus
2.2.1. Peters et al. Delusional Inventory (PDI: Peters et al., 1999)
This questionnaire was used to measure the level of delusional ideation in healthy normal par-
ticipants. This measure is based on the Present State Examination (Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius,
1974) and consists of 40 yes-no questions tapping proneness to unusual thoughts (ranging from
religious beliefs to classical delusional thinking: for example, Do you ever feel as if you are a robot
or zombie without a will of your own? Do you ever feel as if you are being persecuted in some
way? Do you ever feel as if there is a special purpose or mission to your life? Do you ever feel
as if your insides may be rotting? Do you ever feel as if other people can read your mind?). Peters
et al. (1999) have shown that the PDI has good internal consistency (Cronbach a = .88), test retest
reliability (n = 83 over 6–12 months was 0.82) and criterion validity has been established in people
belonging to religious cults and psychotic inpatients showing signiﬁcantly higher scores than nor-
mal controls (Peters, Day, McKenna, & Orbach, 1999; Peters et al., 1999).
2.2.2. False memory task (Roediger & McDermott, 1995)
This was presented on a computer screen using SuperLabTM software. There are two parts to
this task—recalling a set of eight lists individually and then a short recognition task. The subjects
were shown a list of 15 words then asked to recall as many as possible in 2.5 min. The next list was
then shown, until all eight were completed. Following this, the recognition task took place with
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word (whether it was old or new and whether they were sure or not that the word had occurred
or not) based on their memory.
The eight lists were taken from Roediger and McDermott (1995). Each list was composed of
associates to a critical target word. The eight critical words used were: Anger, Black, Bread, Chair,
Cold, Doctor, Mountain, and Needle. These target words had their respective associate words
making up the eight lists with 15 items per list. For example, of the list with the critical word
Anger, the 15 associate words were: mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, ﬁght,
hatred, mean, calm, emotion and enrage. Thus, none of the critical items occurred in any of the
lists. The recall task was scored as follows: Number of Correct Recalls—the number of words that
are recalled only from the lists that have been presented to the subjects (out of 120 words in total).
Number of Target Intrusions—the number of critical target words that have been recalled (out of 8
words relating to the eight lists presented). Number of Other Intrusions—words that may not be
obviously related to the critical target words (or the words given in the lists) or may be idiosyn-
cratic erroneous recalls.
The recognition test consisted of 23 words presented in random order consisting of: eight stud-
ied words and 15 non-studied words (8 critical i.e. Target words semantically related to the stud-
ied words; and 7 unrelated words). Participants also rated each word as to their conﬁdence that it
had occurred in the previously presented lists. A four-point rating scale was used: 1—sure it was
new, 2—probably it was new, 3—probably it was old and 4—sure that the item was old (previ-
ously studied in the lists). Comparisons were made for the sure ratings for studied items (includ-
ing words that they were sure were old i.e. correctly accepted and sure were new i.e. false
negatives); target (containing words they were sure were new correctly rejected and sure were
old false positives) and unrelated (containing words considered as new i.e. correctly rejected
and considered as old i.e. false positives) words Finally following Moritz et al. (2004), we calcu-
lated the Knowledge Corruption Index (based on Moritz et al., 2004), which reﬂects the propor-
tion of high conﬁdence errors as a proportion of all errors.3. Results
3.1. Recall
The recall data are presented in Table 1. This shows that compared to Low PDI scorers, those
with High PDI scores recalled signiﬁcantly more Target, and Other words and signiﬁcantly fewer
Correct words. The percentage of false alarms was 8.04% for the high PDI group and only 1.95%
for the low PDI group.Table 1
Mean (and standard deviation) recall memory for correct and incorrect items (targets and others)
Memory scores High PDI (n = 54) Low PDI (n = 51) ANOVA
Total of correct words 92.04 ± 11.48 97.70 ± 12.99 F1,104 = 5.57, p < .02
Target words 5.57 ± 2.04 1.19 ± 1.43 F1,104 = 163.89, p < .0001
Other words 1.86 ± 2.24 0.72 ± 1.17 F1,104 = 10.82, p < .0001
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Conﬁdence rating—each word in the recognition phase was rated and group comparisons were
made for the sure ratings for studied, target and unrelated words (see Table 2).
The Knowledge Corruption Index (KCI) for high PDI subjects was 46% compared to only
27% for the low PDI (F1,104 = 37.52, p < .001). This means for high PDI subjects almost half of
all errors are high conﬁdence errors (as against just over a quarter for low PDI subjects). When
the KCI was calculated separately for false negative and false positive errors, the latter did not
diﬀer for high and low PDI subjects (4.89% vs. 3.15%: F1,104 = 2.25, p = .14); however, a signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence emerged for false positives (41% vs. 24%: F1,104 = 35.30, p < .001).4. Discussion
The current study has shown that normal healthy subjects who score highly on a measure of
delusional thinking have signiﬁcantly poorer memories than those who score low on a measure
of delusional thinking (the PDI: Peters et al. Delusional Inventory). In particular, when compared
to the high PDI group, the Low PDI group showed signiﬁcantly better recall (recalling signiﬁ-
cantly more correct words, fewer incorrect Target, and Other words). This suggests not only that
proneness to delusional thinking is associated with poorer recall memory, but that it aﬀects the
tendency to make false positives as well (i.e. for Target and other words). The size of the group
diﬀerence was especially marked for the Target items (i.e. those that were not in the original list
but highly related to the list content), where the high PDI recalled more than four times as many
as the low PDI scorers. The High and low PDI subjects did not diﬀer in the conﬁdence they at-
tached to the recognition of items that were in the studied lists; however, for distractor items that
were not studied, the High PDI subjects gave less conﬁdence in terms of rejecting unseen items
and greater conﬁdence in terms of accepting unseen items. This all suggests that high PDI subjects
have a tendency to make false positives (and not to make false negatives).Table 2
Mean number of words that subjects rated as deﬁnitely new and deﬁnitely old in the recognition task
Conﬁdence ratings High PDI Low PDI ANOVA
Mean [SD] Mean [SD]
Studied (n = 8)
Sure new 1 (false negatives) .75 [1.04] .46 [0.79] F1,104 = 2.47, ns
Sure old 4 (correct acceptance) 4.82 [1.99] 5.00 [1.53] F1,104 = 0.26, ns
Target (n = 8)
Sure new 1 (correct rejection) .94 [1.45] 1.70 [1.73] F1,104 = 5.99, p = .016
Sure old 4 (false positives) 5.16 [2.01] 3.09 [1.74] F1,104 = 31.69, p < .0001
Unrelated (n = 7)
Sure new 1 (correct rejection) 3.07 [2.11] 4.14 [1.80] F1,104 = 7.87, p = .006
Sure old 4 (false positives) 1.67 [2.41] .50 [1.13] F1,104 = 10.25, p < .002
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did occur in the list shows that they were attending to the task. It also shows that it is not a generic
failure to distinguish true and false per se, but a decision-making problem that leads them to make
false positives. High PDI subjects show a bias, not only, to endorse untrue items, but also to do
this with signiﬁcantly greater conﬁdence than low PDI subjects. In other words, they are conﬁdent
that they are recognising things they had previously seen (even when they did not). This applies to
unseen as well as related items and indicates that it does not depend solely upon the activation of
related materials e.g. via abnormal semantic activation. In this context, the evidence from priming
studies in patients with schizophrenia may be relevant. Most studies have used priming to achieve
this, which involves using the level of assistance that a word (the prime) gives to the processing of
another word (the target) as a measurement of their proximity within semantic space. For exam-
ple, the prime-target pairing lemon-sour would be expected to result in faster responding than
lemon-bus. Additionally, because concepts are assumed to be associated within a network, activa-
tion may spread, not only to directly related concepts, but also from those concepts to concepts
further in the memory network. Some studies have utilized this and employed an indirect priming
condition whereby, for example, the word lemon activates the related concept sour, which, in turn
activates sweet resulting in lemon priming sweet. Studies examining indirect priming in schizo-
phrenics indicate greater indirect priming (see Spitzer, 1997). In other words, the spread of seman-
tic activation tends to go further and faster. Nevertheless, indirect spreading remains to be
compared in patients with and without delusions.
How do the ﬁndings reported here relate to those of similar studies of patients with schizophre-
nia? The ﬁrst notable thing, is that in two recent studies using the same Roediger and McDermott
(1995) paradigm, schizophrenics and controls showed no diﬀerences in false positive memory (El-
veva˚g et al., 2004; Moritz et al., 2004). By contrast, we have reported large diﬀerences in false po-
sitive memory for normal subjects scoring high and low on delusional ideation. What might be the
implications of these ﬁndings? The ﬁrst possibility is that high PDI scores do not relate to the gen-
eral notion of schizophrenia. The previous studies of schizophrenics did not focus speciﬁcally on
deluded patients and it could be that this is a critical factor and future studies might compare de-
luded and non-deluded schizophrenics in comparisons. A second point concerns the possibility
that the relationship between false positive memory and delusional ideation only exists in the pro-
dromal phase and disappears with full-blown schizophrenia. One possibility relates to the protec-
tion aﬀorded from false positive memories in patients with schizophrenia because they have
generally poor memory. The level of recall in the current study (for high and low PDI scorers)
was 77% and 82%, respectively; this is substantially higher than for schizophrenic patients who
show ﬂoor eﬀects (e.g. Elveva˚g et al., 2004). In other words, patients with schizophrenia are less
prone to false positive memories because they fail to recall anywhere near as much information as
healthy subjects. Further research investigating false memories in schizophrenic patients with
delusions would help address these questions and potentially address issues relating to the notion
that delusional thought is on a continuum ranging from the normal to the abnormal. Addition-
ally, it should be noted that other variables inﬂuence the tendency to produce false positive mem-
ories, including dissociation and fantasy proneness (Merckelbach, Muris, Horselenberg, &
Stougie, 2000) and future studies should examine the relationship of these variables with the
PDI and their potential for mediating the false memory process.
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